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The Henry Louis Gates Jr. arrest provides an illuminating case study to show how the omission of 
dispatch in police reform conversations limits our understanding of police officer action. Using 
conversation analysis, this article analyzes the 911 call and radio transmission from the Gates 
incident to dissect the function of the 911 call-taker, and their impact on policing in the field. This 
analysis shines light on a previously overlooked call-taker function—risk appraisal—and concretely 
shows how the call-taker played a pivotal role in escalating the caller’s uncertainty and, thus, 
primed the responding officer for a more aggressive encounter. 
 













Through unpacking precisely how the call-taker appraised risk—namely through extraction, 
interpretation, and classification of caller information—this article provides a framework to 
evaluate call-taker actions. The findings suggest the need for training that instructs call-takers to 
assess risk in more sophisticated ways. Preserving uncertainty may reduce the overestimation or 
underestimation of incidents and improve future police encounters with the public. 
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Contemporary policing in America is facing serious issues surrounding the level and 
distribution of encounters and arrests, infringements on civil liberties, and the use of force. Tensions 
between law enforcement and the public are at historically high levels (J. Jones, 2015). A series of 
officer-involved killings in places like Ferguson, Staten Island, Cleveland, and Chicago have spurred 
an entire social movement against police brutality. 
Much criminology scholarship attributes these various and sundry challenges to police 
officers’ decisions about where to patrol, who to stop, and how to treat community members. 
Extensive research on proactive policing documents racial and socioeconomic disparities in how 
officers exercise discretion in stops and arrests. Thanks to scholars like Victor Rios (2011), Alice 









(2007), we now understand how individual officer-level decisions can produce and reproduce racial 
disparities in the criminal justice system.  
By contrast, reactive or call-driven policing has not received comparable scholarly attention. 
The neglect of the features of reactive mobilization produces a limited understanding of policing 
because police often are acting in response to telephone calls from individuals requesting police 
services. In 2011, of an estimated 62.9 million U.S. residents who had one or more contacts with the 
police, more than half (32 million) requested police services (Langton & Durose, 2011). Requests 
come from callers who can be uncertain, biased, legally uninformed, or all of these in combination. 
Calls to summon the police can result in arrest and the use of force because responding 
officers primarily are trained in law enforcement and force (Friedman, 2020). It is difficult to assess 
the most serious risks associated with police mobilization because of a lack of national statistics on 
use of force. Former police detective Nick Selby and co-authors help fill this knowledge gap by 
calculating the prevalence of the gravest policing outcome—police killings. They find that 83 of the 
153 national police killings of unarmed civilians in 2015 began with a 911 call (Selby et al., 2016).  
Reviewing local police department reports, albeit a piecemeal approach, further highlights 
how some of the most grievous forms of policing develop, not from officer-initiated encounters but 
from the public’s calls to 911. In a review of 87 officer-involved shootings (OISs) between 2007 and 
2011 in the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police, analysts found that 65% of OISs originated from a call and 
only 25% from officer-initiated contact (Stewart et al., 2012). A 2014 comprehensive review of 114 
use-of-force incidents among officers in the Spokane Police Department found that 66% stemmed 
from a dispatch, whereas only 24% stemmed from officer-initiated contact (Spokane Police 
Department Office of Professional Accountability, 2014). Unlike in the case of proactive policing in 









incident trajectory may be more contingent on the nature of caller requests and the ways in which 
911 call-takers handle them than current criminology literature implies.  
This article dissects the function of the 911 call-taker and illuminates their impact on policing 
in the field. By conducting a fine-grained analysis of the high-profile Henry Louis Gates Jr. case, the 
article uncovers a previously overlooked call-taker function—risk appraisal. Through unpacking 
precisely how call-takers appraise risk—namely through extraction, interpretation, and classification 
of caller information—a framework is provided to evaluate call-taker actions. The Gates case shines 
a particularly bright light on the challenges and dilemmas that can arise during the risk appraisal 
process. These findings are an important step in identifying ways in which police departments can 
pursue more intelligent policies inside dispatch.  
 
PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 Under call-driven policing, a series of interactions takes place before police arrive at the 
scene, all of which produces information that can affect police responses. For much of the public, 
the first point of contact with law enforcement is through a 911 call. A member of the public calls 
911, a 911 call-taker answers and speaks with the caller, and a dispatcher manages the allocation of 
responding police units and transmits information that the call-taker gathered over the radio (Lum et 
al., 2020). At some dispatch centers, the same person answers calls and dispatches police, whereas 
at others the two positions are filled by different workers. Figure 1 illustrates how information flows 
between callers, call-takers, dispatchers, and responding officers. 
[Insert Figure 1] 









set the trajectory of an entire incident. As a result of the work call-takers do to divert, filter out, or 
resolve via telephone inappropriate or misguided requests for police services, a few scholars 
primarily have conceptualized their role as gatekeeper (Neusteter et al., 2019; Percy & Scott, 1985; 
Sharrock & Turner, 1978; Whalen et al., 1988). A recent study finds that call-takers at a dispatch 
center in Fairfax, Virginia, resolve, on average, nearly half of all calls without having to dispatch the 
police (Lum et al., 2020). Gatekeepers, like those in Fairfax, prevent many inappropriate requests 
from reappearing in the legal system (Black, 1973; Silbey & Bittner, 1982).  
 Gatekeeping certainly is an important aspect of call-taking, but it fails to account for the 
other key functions call-takers play, in particular, call classification. Sometimes referred to as 
“slotting” or “recoding,” classification involves interpreting caller information and fitting it into 
meaningful organizational categories (Gilsinan, 1989; Manning, 1988; Prottas, 1978). Practically 
speaking, this means that a call-taker must choose an incident type that aligns with a caller’s 
problem from a set of predetermined incident types in the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system, 
each with a different priority level (Lum et al., 2020). Decisions about the type of incident and 
priority level impact the number of police cars dispatched, the speed at which officers drive to the 
scene, and police perceptions about the call. Indeed, a 2007 study of the Baltimore Police 
Department’s calls for service finds that police officers make assumptions about a call’s legitimacy 
based on information from dispatch, such as the type and location of an incident (Moskos, 2007). 
 Despite the significant consequences call classification can have on policing, it is severely 
under-theorized. A thorough literature review of the 911 system as it relates to policing by 
Neusteter et al. (2019) describes numerous studies that measure call-taker stress and well-being, as 









neighborhoods; none of these studies address how call-takers carry out call classification or how 
they process risk.  
 This article attempts to fill this gap by reconceptualizing call-takers as not only gatekeepers 
but also risk appraisers. In Policing the Risk Society, Ericson and Haggerty (1997) wrote that, “The 
concept of risk … turns people, their organizations, and their environments into myriad categories 
and identities that will make them more manageable.” Although Ericson and Haggerty applied their 
definition of risk mainly to the police, this article applies their definition to the work of call-takers 
who form and transform caller requests into more manageable categories using their own 
knowledge and expertise, rules, classification schemes, and technology to minimize harm.  
This article identifies three key steps in the risk appraisal process—extracting, interpreting, 
and classifying caller information. Extracting information involves asking investigative questions to 
gather information from a caller about the nature of an incident. As information is extracted, the 
call-taker engages in interpretation to make sense of the caller’s statements. These two steps are 
iterative; interpretation helps to guide the direction of questioning as the call moves forward. 
Ultimately, the call-taker classifies the information with an incident type based on the nature of the 
request and level of risk. The dispatcher communicates this information on to the responding police 
officers. 
 Because police call-taking lacks strong governance over the risk appraisal process, call-takers 
can deploy discretion and assessments can suffer from imprecision. Dispatch centers often register 
with the National Emergency Number Association (NENA) to access model call-taking and 
dispatching policies. NENA recommends for call-takers to gather the address or exact location of an 
incident, call-back number, type of emergency, time of occurrence, hazards, and identities of the 









extract, interpret, and classify information, especially when a caller is ambiguous or uncertain. As a 
result, call-takers frequently overestimate incidents. Scholars find that at some call centers, between 
20% and 40% of all crime calls that 911 call-takers enter are downgraded by officers once at the 
scene (Ericson, 1982, p. 96; Reiss, 1971, p. 73; Klinger et al., 1997).  
 Evidence from emergency medical dispatching suggests that more scripted and structured 
call-taking protocols may reduce the prevalence of incident misclassification. In emergency medical 
dispatching, call-takers often are provided flipcharts with checklists or sequential questioning 
protocols to help standardize patient risk assessments (Lum et al., 2020). At some medical dispatch 
centers, call-takers who use priority dispatch protocols—where questions are scripted and incident 
types automatically determined based on caller responses—correctly code calls about “obvious 
death” and “expected death” in 98.5% of all cases (Whitaker et al., 2015). 
 Borrowing from research that illuminates how police officers make judgments in uncertain 
situations helps to explain why police call-takers tend to overestimate uncertain risk and favor over-
response. Police sometimes engage in a minimax strategy—meaning they try to minimize the 
maximum risk—when deciding on a course of action. This strategy can result in police interpreting 
individuals’ actions through the prism of worst-case scenario thinking (Muir, 1977). Muir explains 
that police understood that, “There was a qualitative difference (which all policemen appreciated) 
between being wrong and being disastrously wrong” (Muir, 1977, p. 166). Based on my experiences 
in the field working as a 911 call-taker at a dispatch center in the Midwest, call-takers also use 
minimax thinking. This strategy can be troublesome because training exercises (a) instill an outsized 
concern for officer safety relative to the safety of the subject of a call and (b) assume that over-
responses are preferred to under-responses. In other words, call-takers are often trained that “being 









under-response. Turning to scholarship on the effects of “priming” will reveal precisely why 
overvalued risk appraisals in the direction of over-response can, in fact, be profoundly problematic.  
 
SETTING POLICE EXPECTATIONS: THE PHENOMENON OF PRIMING 
    
 Priming is generally defined as a subliminal or overt stimulus that precedes an event and 
affects a behavioral response (Tulving, 1983). Police responses likely are linked to dispatch decisions 
because of a psychological phenomenon known as “anchoring bias.” Psychologists Amos Tversky and 
Daniel Kahneman (1982) described anchoring bias as a phenomenon whereby people make 
estimates in the face of uncertainty by adjusting from an initial value or a starting point. Because 
“different starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values,” high 
initial values will result in high end values (Tversky & Kahneman 1982, p. 14). If police are primed for 
a high-priority encounter, then, based on anchoring bias, they will be more likely to perceive of the 
incident in those terms upon arrival. 
 Paul Taylor is one of the few researchers who has studied this phenomenon in dispatch. 
Using a firearms training simulator, he found that, “When dispatched to a distal call, an officer’s 
initial understanding of the incident will be formed almost entirely by the information received from 
dispatch” (Taylor 2019, p. 5). In his experiment, dispatchers told one group of officers that the 
suspect in a “possible trespassing in progress” might be holding a gun, they told the other group that 
the suspect was talking on a cell phone. The results showed that 6% of officers who had only been 
advised about a cell phone shot the suspect when he pulled the phone from his pocket in the video 
simulation. This shooting error rate is ten times less than for the officers primed to think the suspect 









Taylor’s findings echo earlier observations by police journalist Jonathan Rubinstein (1973) 
who found that police responses are shaped by information from the dispatcher. After a year of 
police ride-alongs, Rubinstein determined that, “What this unseen person relates to him establishes 
his initial expectations and the manner of his response to the assignment” (Rubinstein 1973, p. 88). 
Any errors by the dispatcher can result in serious problems for the police and public. Rubinstein 
described a situation in which the dispatcher failed to mention to the patrol officer that the call was 
emergent, which is part of a dispatcher’s duty. Because of this omission, the patrol officer arrived 
without lights or sirens to the incident causing the mother—whose child had cut his arm and was 
badly bleeding—to call him “lazy” and threaten to complain to his captain (Rubinstein, 1973, p. 122).  
Given the serious consequences of priming, it is worth considering how decisions call-takers 
make influence the circumstances under which police arrive to a scene. What insights can be 
gleaned by including these initial interactions in an examination of policing?  
 
A CONVERSATION ANALYTIC APPROACH 
 This article presents a detailed case study of the interactions that preceded the Cambridge 
Police Department’s arrival on the scene. Because single case studies are built for in-depth 
exploration into complex phenomena, this approach is well suited for unpacking the process through 
which the 911 call-taker carried out his duties. I selected the Gates case for two main reasons. First, 
this case, unlike most others, received a great deal of national and international media coverage, 
which made it possible to obtain audio recordings and review reports written in its wake. These 
materials helped inform the analysis. Second, from my experiences as a 911 call-taker, I recognize 









incident risk—represent common struggles inside dispatch that transcend this specific case.  
 I obtained two audio recordings that were publicly released by the Cambridge Police after 
the incident. The first audio recording is of the interaction between the 911 caller and call-taker 
(Cambridge Emergency Communications Center, 2009a). The second audio recording is of the 
interaction between the dispatcher and responding officers (Cambridge Emergency Communications 
Center, 2009b). Because conversation analysis (CA) has been the predominant method for analyzing 
recorded interactional data and unpacking the dynamics of interaction, I employ this method to 
transcribe and analyze the transcripts.1  
Conversation analysis is a micro-level approach that first emerged in the 1960s and insists 
social interaction provides a way to understand how institutions and organizations come to life 
(Heritage & Clayman, 2010). Through analyzing interactional patterns, researchers can learn how co-
participants accomplish, or fail to accomplish, institutional goals and tasks. The method requires 
close, repeated listening to audio recordings followed by detailed transcription. Both recordings in 
this analysis were transcribed using conversation analytic transcription conventions, which capture 
the details of talk and interaction as it occurs, including emphasis, overlapping speech, pitch, 
intonation, silence, and inhalations.2 This level of detail is meant to shed light precisely on how 
interactants react to one another’s utterances to co-construct “mutually intelligible courses of 
                                                          
1 
For readers who are interested in learning more about conversation analysis methods, see Clayman and Gill, 
(2012) and Sidnell (2012).  
2 
Underscored utterances capture stress or emphasis. Brackets mark overlapping or simultaneous talk. Up and 
down arrows indicate an upward or downward shift in pitch. A period at the end of a phrase marks 
downward intonation to signify a statement. A question mark at the end of a phrase marks upward 
intonation and signifies a question. Numbers in parentheses mark lengths of silence, represented in tenths of 
a second. A period followed by the letter “h” marks an in-breath, and the length of the in-breath is reflected 
in the number of “h’s.” For more information about a conversation analytic approach to transcriptions, see 









action.” (Clayman & Gill, 2012). CA is becoming increasingly prominent in studies of 911 emergencies 
and police–public contact (Cromdal et al., 2008; N. Jones & Raymond, 2012; Meehan, 1989; 
Raymond & Zimmerman, 2007; Whalen et al., 1988; Zimmerman, 1984, 1992a, 1992b).  
 
THE INCIDENT 
On July 16, 2009, Harvard University Professor Henry Louis Gates Jr. returned home to 
Cambridge from a trip abroad. Finding his front door jammed shut, he attempted to push the door 
open with the help of his driver. Shortly thereafter, Sgt. James Crowley, an 11-year veteran of the 
Cambridge police, was dispatched to the address in response to a 911 call about a possible in-
progress breaking and entering. Six minutes later, after a heated verbal encounter between the two 
men, Sgt. Crowley arrested one of the leading African American scholars in the United States for 
“exhibiting loud and tumultuous behavior in a public place” (The Cambridge Review Committee, 
2010, p. 55). The struggle between Gates and Crowley reignited a national conversation about race 
and law enforcement in the United States. 
The Gates case is one of the more prominent controversies of the past decade and 
exemplifies the prevailing assumptions informing current debates about police reform. Both news 
media and academic outlets widely covered the incident. According to the Pew Research Center, 
nearly 20% of all African-American–related media coverage in 2009 mentioned the Gates incident 
(Guskin et al., 2010). Public discussion and expert analysis after the arrest tended to emphasize Sgt. 
Crowley’s and Gates’s behavior at the scene, focusing in particular on Crowley’s racial profiling and 









significant but incomplete because they fail to address decisions that were made inside the 
Cambridge Emergency Communications Center before Sgt. Crowley arrived on scene.  
 
EXPLAINING PROBLEMATIC POLICE–PUBLIC ENCOUNTERS: THE GATES CASE IN SCHOLARLY 
CONTEXT 
The final report by the Cambridge Review Committee—a group of academics, law 
enforcement leaders, and lawyers tasked with analyzing the incident—advocated for police reforms 
to improve the style of interaction between the police and public without giving serious 
consideration to the decisions that established Sgt. Crowley’s initial expectations. Indeed, many of 
the report’s recommendations involved improving aspects of officer on-scene behavior by treating 
individuals with respect, de-escalating tense situations, and appropriately exercising discretion (The 
Cambridge Review Committee, 2010).  
Both the committee’s report, and a second report about the Gates arrest from the National 
Institute of Justice’s (NIJ) Executive Session on Policing and Public Safety, concluded that the incident 
would not have escalated to the point it did if Sgt. Crowley had applied more “procedural justice.” 
Procedural justice is based on the idea that when police treat individuals respectfully and with 
dignity it will lead to greater cooperation between the police and public (Tyler, 2004; Tyler & Fagan, 
2008; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Fairness and procedural justice are pillars of “rightful policing,” and these 
features of police work establish community trust in the police (Meares & Neyroud, 2015). From 
Gates’s perspective, Crowley treated him disrespectfully, especially because it should have been 
obvious he was not a burglar given his age, need for a cane—Gates’s right leg is two inches shorter 









Although recommendations to improve on-scene decisions made by the police have 
potential to advance policing, they are focused solely on the moment of interaction between police 
and subject and thus miss other potential areas for reform. Such a narrow focus ignores the reasons 
why Crowley was on scene in the first place and how the decisions made before Crowley arrived 
directly influenced the interaction.  
On that day, dispatch sent Sgt. Crowley to an in-progress, high-priority incident in response 
to a 911 call at Gates’s address that turned out to be inaccurate, and yet there was no inquiry into 
the call or the actions of the 911 call-taker. The dispatcher said over the radio, “Respond to 
seventeen Ware Street for a possible B and E in progress. Two SPs (suspects) barged their way into 
the home. They have suitcases” (Cambridge Emergency Communications Center, 2009b). These 
three short statements primed Crowley to perceive of the incident as a serious crime with multiple 
suspects. So serious, in fact, that he drove the wrong way down a one-way street to reach the 
address as quickly as possible. Crowley told the Cambridge Review Committee that in the first few 
minutes of the encounter, he had “legitimate concerns about safety and security” and the report 
concluded that these concerns contributed to his abrupt demeanor (The Cambridge Review 
Committee, 2010, p. 6).  
 In addition to the information from dispatch, Sgt. Crowley’s heightened response likely was 
also shaped by the community and organizational context in which the incident occurred. Cambridge 
is an affluent East Coast city where residents pride themselves in having a diverse and inclusive 
community (The Cambridge Review Committee, 2010). In 2009, the population was 68% White, 12% 
Black, 12% Asian, and 7% Hispanic, which made it more diverse than the average Massachusetts city 
or town. Relative to similarly sized cities across the nation, Cambridge ranks well below the 









2009). The majority of calls-for-service are for quality-of-life issues and nonemergencies like noise 
and traffic complaints (The Cambridge Review Committee, 2010). In this type of low-crime context, 
an in-progress breaking-and-entering call would elicit a magnified response.  
 When public commentators inquired as to why Crowley was on the scene they were quick to 
call it an instance of racial profiling, which in and of itself fails to pay sufficient attention to the role 
the 911 caller and call-taker played. President Obama, on nationally televised news, spoke about the 
incident in racial profiling terms: “There’s a long history in this country of African Americans and 
Latinos being stopped disproportionately by the police” (Cooper, 2009, para. 4). Racial profiling 
certainly may have led Crowley to engage with and arrest Gates, but it is not the reason he was on 
scene and primed to view the situation in the way he did.  
Even reviewers of the incident who were well aware of its 911-driven nature nonetheless 
returned to racial profiling as the core problem. The authors of the NIJ report wrote, “It is important 
to emphasize that Sergeant Crowley arrived at Gates’s home in response to a 911 call as opposed to 
an exercise of his own discretion” (Meares & Neyroud, 2015, p. 2). Because Sgt. Crowley was 
responding to a call, they admitted that Gates’s “experience fit somewhat uneasily into the typical 
legal framework of racial profiling” (p. 2). Yet, despite these concessions, the authors nonetheless 
used a racial profiling framework—a framework that evaluates whether an officer’s actions are 
lawful, effective, and fair—to explain the interaction.  
Meares and Neyroud (2015) defended using this framework because Professor Gates 
described his experience as one of racial profiling. By making this choice, the authors effectively shut 
down any lines of inquiry into the call-driven aspects of the incident, as a racial profiling framework 
does not take into account events leading up to a police officer’s arrival. In fact, both the NIJ and 









complexities associated with call-driven policing—such as why Crowley was responding to an in-
progress breaking-and-entering call and the expectations set in motion by that process.  
The Gates case is by no means unique; it is emblematic of a serious blind spot in 
contemporary conversations about police reform. The 2015 President’s Task Force on 21st Century 
Policing Report—the most prominent recent police reform agenda—identified six areas to improve 
police–public relations: (1) Build trust and legitimacy through procedural justice, (2) develop 
comprehensive use of force policies, (3) appropriately use technology, (4) cultivate community 
policing, (5) train and educate officers, and (6) support officer wellness and safety. Nowhere in the 
report is 911 or dispatch mentioned (President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015). 
Similarly, Campaign Zero—an online clearinghouse of police reforms developed by activists 
connected to Black Lives Matter—does not mention dispatch among its ten recommendations to 
“limit police interventions, improve community interactions, and ensure accountability” (Campaign 
Zero, 2019, para. X). Moreover, a review of Department of Justice consent decrees that call for 
improved use of force, citizen oversight, officer training, and early intervention systems to monitor 
officer behavior made no mention of dispatch (Walker & Macdonald, 2008). The leading police 
reform reports all remained silent on dispatch.  
 
EXTRACTING, INTERPRETING, AND CLASSIFYING INFORMATION FROM THE 911 CALLER 
The Cambridge Emergency Communications Center (ECC) received a 911 call at 12:43 PM on 
July 16th, 2009. Three key figures played a role in the early stages of the incident: the caller who 
reported two men with suitcases trying to get into the house, the call-taker who processed the call, 









incident will reveal, the caller cautiously presented an ambiguous problem, but the 911 call-taker 
made escalating decisions while extracting, interpreting, and classifying that information—decisions 
that shaped Sgt. Crowley’s expectations.  
Extracts from the audio recording reveal that the caller was markedly uncertain about the 
nature of the problem. 
 (…) 
17 911: Alright whatsa problem tell me exactly what happened. 
18 CLR: .hh Um w- I- don’t know what’s happening, I just had an ah 
19 older woman uh standing here and she had noticed two  
20 gentlemen .h trying to get in a house at that number  
21 seventeen ware street .hh and uh they kinda had to barge in  
22 and they broke (.) the screen door and they finally got in  
23 and when I had looked I went (.) further closer to the house 24 a little 
bit after the gentlemens were already in the house, 25 .h I noticed t-two 
suitcases so I’m not sure if these are two 26 individuals who actually work 
there I mean who live there?.hh 
 
In line 17, the call-taker follows protocol by asking about the problem. His language choice in the 
problem query—“tell me exactly what happened”—sets a high-standard of information extraction 
that the caller seems to resist from the outset of the call. This resistance is evidenced by her initial 
in-breath (“.hh”) and series of false starts (“um – w – I”) before saying, “I don’t know what’s 
happening.”  
Notice how the caller is subsequently cautious and refrains from making any inferences 
about what she has witnessed. Instead, in lines 19–26, she provides a series of ostensibly factual 
observations to the call-taker—an older woman was standing outside, that woman (not herself) 









and so on. In lines 25–26, she invokes the suitcases to suggest that the men might live at the house. 
She concludes her account by speculating that the incident may be entirely innocuous.  
Despite the caller’s portrayal of the incident as possibly benign—like the men being locked 
out of the house—the call-taker presses the caller to categorize the incident in criminal terms.  
27 911: You think they might have been break[ing 
28 CLR: [(m’side) .hh I don’t  
29 know:: cuz I have no: idea I just[ 
 
Rather than initially phrasing his question in line 27 from a milder position (e.g., “you think they 
might have been locked out?”)—which would be more than warranted given the caller’s ambiguous 
account of what she saw—the call-taker asks an escalating question. This decision is shaped by his 
interpretation of the caller’s uncertainty through the lens of worst-case scenario thinking. He 
proposes that the men may be breaking-in in an attempt to classify the incident. When pressed to 
make this criminal classification, the caller declines to affirm the call-taker’s categorization. She 
responds in lines 28–29 that she does not know whether the men were breaking in. The caller thus 
maintains her more cautious stance and, by implication, shifts the responsibility of classifying the 
incident wholly back on the call-taker.  
The call-taker hesitates to move forward with his “breaking-and-entering” classification 
without the caller’s agreement and instead backtracks and tries again.  
30 911: [well do you think the  
31 possibility might have been there, or ah how- what do you mean  










In lines 30–32, the call-taker seems to be exploring the hypothesis that there is an in-progress 
burglary in several different ways. In line 31, he emphasizes the word “possibility” to see whether 
accentuating the hypothetical nature of the incident will garner the caller’s agreement. But before 
waiting for a response, he revises his question and re-invokes the caller’s previous characterization 
(“barged in”) to invite clarification. 
The call-taker’s efforts to have the caller support his “breaking-and-entering” classification 
once again fail.  
33 CLR: Um: no they were pushing the door in: like uh:: .hh uhm::: l-  
34 like the screen part of the b-front door was= 
35 911: =How [did they  
36 CLR: [had like cut 
37 911: Open the door itself with the lock off. 
38 CLR: They:: I didn’t see a key or anything cuz I was a little bit  
39 away from the door but I did notice that they, (.)  
40 911: And what did the [suitcases  
41 CLR: [pushed their 
42 911: have to do with anything.  
43 CLR: I don’t know=I’m just saying that’s what I saw. Uh- ah- I hh.  
44 jus[t  
 
The caller resists the call-taker’s “kick the door” characterization in lines 33–34. Instead, she says 
that the men were pushing the door. Her observation does not seem to satisfy the call-taker, so he 
interrupts the caller and presses her further about the incident. In line 40, the call-taker returns to 









over the suitcases shows that he failed to grasp the exculpatory import of the suitcases as initially 
presented by the caller.  
Despite never gaining the caller’s agreement about the nature of the incident, the call-taker 
chooses to move forward on the presumption that a break-in has occurred.  
45 911: [Do you know what apahtment they ah: broke into. 
46 (0.4) 
47 CLR: No. They just the first floor (.) I don’t even think that it’s  
48 an apartment. It’s seventeen Ware Street. It’s a house. It’s a  
49 yellow house. (0.7) Number seventeen. (0.9) I don’t know if  
50 they live there and they just had a hard time with their key 51 but I 
did notice that they (.) kinda used their: a shoulder to 52 try to barge in 
and they got in. I don’t know if they had a  
53 key or not cuz I couldn’t see from my ang:le. But: ya know 54 when I 
looked a little closely that’s when [I saw (…) 
 
Notice in line 45 how he asks the caller for the apartment number that the men “broke into.” After 
clarifying the address, the caller in lines 49–51 immediately attempts to dial-down the call-taker’s 
characterization by suggesting, for a second time, that the men might merely be locked out of the 
house. The call-taker does not up-take her proposition and instead moves on to conclude the call. 
After extracting and interpreting information from the caller, the call-taker must classify the 
incident. The technology inside dispatch does not allow for simply passing along a caller’s raw 
information; it must be classified with an incident type. Unlike cut-and-dry calls about barking dogs 
or illegally parked cars, the Gates call underscores the complexities that can arise in appraising risk 
when callers are uncertain and incidents straddle priority levels. The call-taker must decide whether 









a lower priority classification like a “suspicious circumstance,” or even a “citizen assist.” See Figure 2 
for a visual depiction of the choices that a call-taker typically faces when classifying an incident such 
as this one. By line 45, it seems that the call-taker has decided to classify the call as a breaking and 
entering.  
*Insert Figure 2+ 
The call-taker faces competing pressures when making classification decisions. On the one 
hand, overestimating the incident will prime the police for a serious encounter, tie up police units, 
and put pedestrians and other drivers at risk. On the other hand, underestimating the incident can 
open the call-taker up to liability and potential disciplinary action. Although we do not know for 
certain, it is likely that the concern about overestimating explains why the call-taker repeatedly 
attempted to garner the caller’s agreement about his hypothesis, but ultimately the concern about 
underestimating the incident leads the call-taker to escalate the caller’s uncertainty.  
 
RELAYING INFORMATION TO THE RESPONDING OFFICER 
The next interaction occurs over the radio between the dispatcher and responding police 
officers. The dispatcher’s information comes directly from the call-taker. In this exchange, the 
dispatcher further escalates the situation by recontextualizing the caller’s observations.  
 (…) 
01 CO1: Control to car one. Eighteen four ah. 
02 OF1: O-R.  
03 CO1: Respond to seventeen Ware street for a possible B and E in  









05 have suitcases. RP (five) to SPs. Uh. Stand-by. (0.2)  
06 Trying to get furtha. 
07 (0.7)  
 
Lines 01–07 show the abridged version of the lengthy and complicated caller/call-taker interaction 
detailed above.3 The dispatcher sends police to a possible breaking and entering and refers to the 
two men as “suspects” who “barged” into the house with suitcases, despite the caller never 
affirming the call-taker’s proposal that the men were breaking in and mentioning the suitcases as 
evidence that they might actually live at the address. 
The dispatcher fails to communicate the stance of the caller in relationship to the incident in 
the first transmission creating subsequent interactional troubles.  
   (…) 
17 OF1: (Inaudible) Can you have the caller come to the front door. 
18 (0.5) 
19 CO1: I’m sorry repeat? 
20 (0.7) 
21 OF1: Can you have the caller come to the front door. (said slowly) 
22 (1.5) 
23 CO1: It’s not her house. She doesn’t live there. She’s uh a witness  
24 in this.  
25 (1.7) 
26 OF2: C-13 to control I’m on Broadway. I’m going to respond.  
27 (0.5) 
                                                          










28 CO1: Received.  
29 (0.7) 
30 OF3: 52 to control. 
31 CO2: Answering 52.  
32 (1.0) 
33 OF3: I’m out with a uh gentleman says he resides here. (inaudible)  
34 Uncooperative. But uh: keep the cars coming.  
35 (0.5) 
36 CO2: Copy. (…) 
 
Confusion over the stance of the caller is evident in lines 17–25 when a responding officer asks the 
dispatcher to have the caller come to the front door and the dispatcher, after asking the officer to 
repeat his question, replies with emphasis that the caller does not live at the house and is “uh a 
witness in all this.” The decision by dispatch to not initially relay information about the caller’s 
relationship to the incident may have further escalated the situation by causing the officer to initially 
incorrectly assume that the caller was inside the house during a serious crime.  
Because radio traffic must be concise, as police and dispatchers are competing for broadcast 
space over air waves, many of the particularities of calls are stripped away by call-takers and 
dispatchers. In some cases, particularities are superfluous, but in others, they can be critical to 
understanding the nature of the call. In this case, the dispatcher failed to relay the caller’s evident 
uncertainty as well as her willingness to entertain the possibility that the incident, although 
suspicious, may be entirely innocuous.  
In short, although the Cambridge Review Committee Report concluded that, “Sergeant 
Crowley and Professor Gates each missed opportunities to ‘ratchet down’ the situation and end it 









Cambridge Review Committee, 2010, p. 26). They played pivotal roles in taking an ambiguous and 
cautious call and generating a high-priority dispatch.  
 
DISCUSSION AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
This article offers three main contributions to our understanding of call-taking and its impact 
on police encounters with the public. First, by reviewing the key reports that came out after the 
arrest of Henry Louis Gates Jr., as well as broader national police reform agendas, I bring attention to 
the unfortunate absence of dispatch in public policy debates about policing. Whether in the shooting 
of 12-year-old Tamir Rice by Officer Timothy Loehman or the fatal tasing of 58-year-old Euree Martin 
in Georgia by deputies—both of which started with a 911 call and were arguably mishandled by 
dispatch—scholars repeatedly overlook the ways in which 911 callers, call-takers, and dispatchers 
affect police responses. The approach used here stresses the need for scholars to apply a wider 
frame when examining police behavior, one that includes the interactions that take place before the 
police arrive at a scene. 
Second, by using a conversation analytic approach, this article unpacks the functions of call-
taking and reconceptualizes the role of the 911 call-taker as that of risk appraiser. This 
reconceptualization transcends the Gates case and provides a framework for policy makers to 
evaluate future call-taker behavior. Specifically, this article calls for greater evaluation of the 
information extraction, interpretation, and classification steps of the call-taking process when 
reviewing police–public encounters. Analyzing these often-overlooked aspects of call-taking could 









counterfactual, it is altogether possible the interaction would not have unfolded as it did had Sgt. 
Crowley not been primed to believe he was encountering a breaking and entering.  
Third, by bringing to bear a methodology not traditionally used in the field of criminology, I 
expand the methodological toolkit available to researchers in this arena. Such a method has growing 
relevance given the proliferation of new surveillance technologies that record two-way interactions 
between the police and the public. Sociologists Geoff Raymond and Nikki Jones already are applying 
CA to body camera footage to examine how verbalizations from police have the potential to reduce 
use of force incidence. CA can help shed light on how and when interactions go well or go badly and 
document best practices for 911 call-takers, dispatchers, and police. 
The inclusion of dispatch in the Gates incident introduces the possibility for a distinct set of 
policy reforms that go beyond improving officer behavior at the scene. Reforms targeted at training 
call-takers and dispatchers to appraise risk in more sophisticated ways is one such example. 
Although legitimate liability concerns may lead 911 call-takers to escalate callers’ requests, the 
account here indicates there are risks on the other side as well. Current training practices often 
disregard the costs that can come from escalation and, instead, encourage call-takers to upgrade 
incidents in the face of uncertainty. Training modules that present concrete examples challenging 
the assumption that overresponse is preferable may help call-takers de-escalate situations. Such a 
training change would require police leadership to formally recognize the risk appraisal function of 
call-taking.  
Another locus for policy intervention exists at the intersection of training and technology. 
The Gates case highlights the costs that can arise from flattening caller uncertainty. Reforms 
targeted at preserving callers’ uncertainties and cautions might improve outcomes. CAD technology 









call-takers could indicate whether a caller presents high levels of uncertainty when reporting high-
priority incidents by checking a box in CAD. This feature would allow call-takers to signal quickly to 
the dispatcher and police that their information classification choice may be overestimated. Not only 
might preserving caller uncertainty have improved the outcome of the Gates encounter, but it also 
might have prevented the shooting of Tamir Rice. In that case, the dispatcher failed to convey to the 
responding officer that the 911 caller cautioned that the male in the park with a gun was “probably a 
juvenile” and the gun was “probably fake” (Schuessler, 2017). 
Evidence from emergency medical dispatching suggests that policy interventions aimed at 
the information extraction phase of call-taking also might help address some problems of 
overresponse. Unlike in fire and medical dispatching in which departments use protocols and scripts 
for call-taking, police dispatching lacks standardized protocols. This can produce variation across 911 
operators in how they ask questions. In the Gates case, we see the call-taker repeatedly press the 
caller to identify the incident in criminal terms. Another call-taker may not have proceeded in the 
same way. Standardizing questions could help to guide which line of questioning call-takers should 
pursue in high-pressure situations. This type of “criteria-based dispatch” approach currently is being 
piloted among police dispatchers in Tucson, Arizona (Vera Institute of Justice, 2019).  
The Gates incident raises important questions for criminologists. It is worth considering what 
might have happened if instead of first asking the caller whether the men were breaking in, the call-
taker had asked whether they were locked out. Imagine, too, if the call-taker had downgraded the 
call to a suspicious circumstance. Or, if the dispatcher had simply passed on the caller’s persistent 
uncertainties to Sgt. Crowley. We likely will never know the answers to these questions, but a 
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Figure 1 illustrates the flow of information from 911 callers, 911 call-takers, and dispatchers to 






















Figure 2 depicts information classification options, and associated priority levels, that would be 
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